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LEADER OF THE SEVENTH
The Honorable Harlington Wood, Jr.*
Late in 1981, one of my colleagues in Chicago on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit informed me he had just heard who was
being appointed by President Reagan to fill the vacancy on our court.
"Who?", I quickly inquired, as I had not. "It's some professor from the
University of Chicago named Posner," he responded. In disbelief,
matching his, I asked, "Did you say a professor of some sort?" "Yes," he
said, "that's the word from Washington." Our conversation continued.
"What for?", was my next question, adding before he answered, "The
good professor has probably never tried a jury case in his life, so what
good will he be to us? He really ought to go work in the real world of law
for a while and then maybe come here later." My colleague added he had
heard that our new colleague was a law and economics expert. He and I
initially shared misgivings about having a professor colleague, but our
memories quickly began to influence us. Each of us realized we were
greatly indebted to our own law school professors, or we wouldn't be
colleagues on the court. Learned Hand in his Holmes lectures at Harvard
in 1958 remembering his professors told his audience,
I carried away the impress of a band of devoted scholars;
patient, considerate, courteous and kindly, whom nothing could
daunt and nothing could bribe. The memory of those men has
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been with me ever since. Again and again they have helped me
when the labor seemed heavy, the task seemed trivial, and the
confusion seemed indecipherable.
Lawyers don't have to be a Learned Hand to share those sentiments. As
we began to consider our new situation more rationally, we decided not to
rush to judgment, but to reserve our opinions about our new colleague.
Professor Richard A. Posner got confirmed by the Senate, and I first met
him when he arrived to be sworn in as the junior member of our elevenjudge court in 1981. In spite of some lingering skepticism, I knew we
would have to make the best of it. Judge Posner did, after all, seem like a
very pleasant fellow, obviously was very smart, and thankfully even
showed a sense of humor. My comments are not going to be a scholarly
analysis of Judge Posner's significant cases. I'll leave that to scholars,
judges and lawyers who will be reviewing and using them. This, instead, is
intended only as an inside personal view of the man and the judge, so let's
proceed.
Judge Posner began to exercise his expertise. In a case involving a
breach of contract and a preliminary injunction he wrote for the majority
making an effort to simplify things for some of the rest of us. He
explained his approach as follows:
These mistakes can be compared, and the one likely to be less
costly can be selected, with the help of a simple formula: grant
the preliminary injunction if but only if P x H. > (1-P) x Hd, or,
in other words, only if the harm to the plaintiff if the injunction
is denied, multiplied by the probability that the denial would be
an error (that plaintiff, in other words, will win at trial), exceeds
the harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted, multiplied
by the probability that granting the injunction would be error.2
The explanation went on, but without help to me. I was pleased to see,
however, that another old-fashioned colleague of mine, Luther Swygert,
our former chief, now deceased, dissented. He admitted that his dissent
might seem harsh, and it was a strong dissent. He concluded that he
would have preferred not to try to reduce the "well-developed and
complex law of preliminary injunctions to a 'simple' mathematical
formula."3 I welcomed Judge Swygert's view, but it was apparent that our
old-fashioned approaches to some issues were fast approaching

1. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES

LECTURES,

1958 77 (1958).

2. American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th
Cir. 1986).
3. Id. at 608.
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obsolescence. I went to work, therefore, reviewing my notes and texts
from some law and economics institutes I had attended for federal judges,
but it was a little late.
Judge Posner and I got better acquainted when we sat on a case
involving a barge that had broken loose from its moorings along the
Chicago ship canal and caused damage.4 How to apportion the damages
among those involved was our problem. Judge Posner wrote the opinion
for the panel remanding the case to the district court for further
proceedings. I fully agreed with the decision, but I had some trouble with
the way Judge Posner undertook to explain the apportionment of those
damages, so I wrote separately. I noted in my concurrence that Judge
Posner had suggested, "'that relative fault is in inverse ratio to the costs of
accident avoidance to the respective parties."
Even if I had fully
understood that formula, I was dubious about trying to apply it. I
conceded, however, that it might be a more efficient approach, but not
being an expert in economics as were my two colleagues, I would prefer,
to approach comparative fault determination in the old-fashioned way.6
Judge Posner lessened the pain for many, however, by concluding his
opinion with this aspirin, "the judge and the parties should not feel
compelled to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of barge transportation from
the ground up."7

Let's now look at some of Judge Posner's biographical facts only barely
summarized here from his curriculum vitae of thirty-three pages packed
with his accomplishments. Those pages are followed by another seventyseven pages listing his published judicial opinions and dissents, at least
1500 of them and growing daily. A Phi Beta Kappa, he graduated summa
cum laude from Yale in 1959, but he made up for his poor showing at
Yale by graduating from Harvard Law in 1962, magna cum laude
(emphasis added). While at Harvard, he was president of the Harvard
Law Review. After college he clerked for Justice Brennan, served at the
Federal Trade Commission, and then served as an assistant to the
Solicitor General of the United States. In 1968 he began teaching at
Stanford as an associate professor followed the next year by a full
professorship at the University of Chicago. He continues there even now
on a part-time basis as a senior lecturer. In the meantime he has written
4. Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. National Marine, Inc., 984 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1993).

5. Id. at 890.
6. Id. My other newly-appointed colleague on this panel was Frank
Easterbrook, another distinguished professor from the University of Chicago who

became Deputy Solicitor General of the United States.
7. Id. at 889.
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about thirty books and over 300 articles and book reviews, but he is
always current in his court work, more current than some of the rest of us.
He is the only person I know who can draft an opinion with one hand and
write a new book simultaneously with the other. In addition to a number
of awards, he has honorary degrees from Georgetown University and
Yale, even from the University of Ghent.8
I thought it admirable when, early on in his judicial career, Judge
Posner endeavored to make up for any imagined "deficiencies" in his
judicial education by bravely volunteering and serving as trial judge in the
U.S. District Courts. Some of us waited expectantly for the resulting
appeals, and they came. In one concerning a copyright infringement the
district court order was "vacated and the case remanded for further
proceeding not inconsistent with the opinion."' One who has helped us in
Judge Posner's real life legal education is former Chief Judge William
Bauer, a former U.S. attorney and U.S. district judge in Chicago. Judge
Bauer knows his way around not only in a law library, but also in and
around the trial courts, state and federal.' ° Judge Posner had trouble as a
trial judge in a warranty action for damages. On appeal the only issue was
whether he had permitted adequate voir dire during jury selection, the
type of problem we had anticipated. The jury awarded the plaintiff about
$95,000 in damages, but our court, in an opinion written by Judge Bauer,
vacated the jury's verdict and remanded for a new trial.' In another of his
trial court cases, a defeated candidate for judge of a city court alleged that
the defendants, by putting up a candidate with the same name as
plaintiff's causing voter confusion, had conspired to defraud the plaintiff
and the local voters of their constitutional rights. 2 Our court affirmed
Judge Posner in holding that the civil rights statute governing conspiracy
to deprive persons of rights or privileges did not reach non-racial political
conspiracies." This time Judge Posner had a winner. While it now looked
like his supplementary practical education might be complete, Judge
Posner has continued to help out in district courts, even while serving as

8. You can go beyond this recap if you desire with your own computer,
http://www.law.UChicago.edu/Posner, but have plenty of paper available.
9. Deltake, Inc. v. Advanced Sys., Inc., 767 F.2d 357, 364 (7th Cir. 1985).
10. See Judge Bauer's dissent on a subject dear to the hearts of many
Chicagoans in Club Misty, Inc. v. Laski, 208 F.3d 615, 622-25 (7th Cir. 2000).
11. Art Press, Ltd. v. Western Printing Machinery Co., 791 F.2d 616 (7th Cir.
1986).
12. Grimes v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1359, 1360 (7th Cir. 1985).
13. Id.at 1366.
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our Chief Judge.
In a complicated case decided early this year in which I
participated, we again gave his trial court work a hard look."5 Most of it
stood the test, but the case was remanded in part for the entry of an
amended judgment; only a minor setback in Judge Posner's postgraduate
education. It is probably only fair to admit reluctantly that the rest of us
who have been trial judges have also had our share of reversals.
Judge Posner's appellate opinions cover the whole legal spectrum, from
the significant to the routine. Sometimes his opinions are even interesting
to non-lawyers because they tell a story without the color of the story
being omitted as irrelevant or being obscured by legal jargon. This year,
for instance, he wrote an important opinion affirming the convictions of
members of Chicago's "El Rukin" street gang on a variety of federal
charges, mainly narcotics violations and murders committed in the course
of turf wars with rival gangs, all part of a wide-ranging conspiracy
reaching back into the 1960s. 16 In another one, no gang wars, but a
widow's benefits were the issue. 7 The plaintiff, Judge Posner observed,
had "made a career of marriage. We count seven."' 8 Shortly thereafter
he wrote one which began, "The plaintiff, Lee, filed two insane
complaints charging the United States and China with a conspiracy to
'bio-chemically and bio-technologically infect and invade' various people
including Lee with a mind reading mental torture device that Lee calls
'Mind Accessing and Torturing via Remote Energy Transferring
' 9 To counter that problem Lee claimed
(MATRET).. ".
to have developed
a variety of space technologies including an e-mail system and a nanny
service to enable victims to relocate on certain safe planets.2 His case was
held, not surprisingly, to be frivolous and the appeal was dismissed. Lee
may have envisioned himself as some sort of an entrepreneur out on the
cutting edge, but the court did not.2 ' A little later Judge Posner was
selected to see if as an arbitrator, not a judge, he could somehow work out
a settlement between Microsoft and the Government in the Government's

14. Chief Judge Posner completed his term as Chief Judge on August 1, 2000.
He was succeeded by Judge Joel Flaum.
15. Bankcard America, Inc. v. Universal Bancard Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 477 (7th

Cir. 2000).
16. United States v. Boyd, 208 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2000).
17. Barron v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 2000).
18. Id. at 985.
19. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1025 (7th Cir. 2000).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1027. I wonder what was originally thought of Bill Gates as he
began to develop new ideas and technologies, but plaintiff Lee was no Bill Gates.
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anti-trust suit. This time he was dealing with a genuine entrepreneur, but
he could not get it done, so at this writing that conflict continues. In my
view Judge Posner was the best possible choice to try to bring that very
significant case to a fair and equitable settlement. If he couldn't do it, no
one could. By now that case has proceeded I know not where.
I'll mention just a couple of his other cases, one involving a seven-year
feud between Plaintiff Hilton and his dog with a neighbor about the dog."
Judge Posner wrote that Hilton's dog was appropriately named
"Rommel," so the problem is evident. Finally, Hilton tired of his own dog
and after being arrested for cruelty to Rommel, gave Rommel up for
adoption. As Judge Posner remarks, the subsequent history of Rommel
may not be strictly germane, but for chuckles he gives us a little of it
anyway. Hilton then decided he wanted his dog back. Being unsuccessful
he protested at an open hearing of the village council by "dragging
[Rommel's] empty leash behind him to punctuate his plea.",2' Also this
year, Judge Posner dealt with copyright and procedural issues in a suit
against Prince, the well known popular singer, in which Judge Posner
showed some •knowledge,
not just of the law, but of modern music and
• 24
Egyptian hieroglyphics. Reading Judge Posner's opinions can often be
welcome relief from the ordinary, but of course only if they do not turn on
some mathematical formula not understood by me.
Judge Posner, among other things, is always open, candid, frank, never
pompous, and is approachable and responsive. In another opinion he
wrote that the problem at hand required the court to "untie a procedural
knot partly of our own tying., 25 The court took the blame for that
problem of its own creation. In another case in which he was presiding
and I was sitting next to him, he said something to counsel during oral
argument I would never have said. Near the end of counsel's argument
Judge Posner leaned forward and advised counsel that his was "the most
stupid argument" he had ever heard. Counsel was no more shocked than
I was, but I, too, thought it was a totally worthless argument. Judge
Posner's candor hopefully may have awakened counsel so that in the
future counsel will give more thought to his cases and be a better
appellate lawyer because of it. The next time counsel comes back to our
court, I hope he will have learned his lesson from Judge Posner and will
deserve to win his case. Nor are government agencies spared when they
22. Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2000).
23. Id. at 1006.
24. Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2000).
25. Jays Foods, L.L.C. v. Chemical & Allied Prods. Workers Union, Local 20,
AFL-CIO, 208 F.3d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 2000).
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need some straight talk. In a deportation case, the Board of Immigration
Appeals denied asylum to an alien relying entirely on a U.S. State
Department "Country Report. ''26 Judge Posner wrote the opinion
reversing the Board's decision. He noted that the Board in asylum cases
had not taken to heart previous judicial criticisms of its performance. I
expect, however, the Board will the next time. To help persuade the
Board, Judge Posner wrote that "[t]he elementary principles of
administrative law, the rules of logic, and common sense seem to have
eluded the Board in this as in other cases. We are being blunt, but
Holmes once remarked the paradox that it often takes a blunt instrument
to penetrate a thick hide. 27
My admiration that quickly developed for Judge Posner does not mean
I always agree with him even though I always enjoy working with him. I'll
give you a couple of examples. In a class action brought by professional
participants in horse racing in Illinois against the Illinois Racing Board,
Judge Posner for a divided en banc court held that a Board rule requiring
jockeys and other racing participants to submit to random drug testing did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.28 It was so held without the necessity
of showing any justification for testing, not even mere suspicion. I
thought otherwise and dissented, as I had on the original panel. There
was no history in the record whatsoever of drug-related accidents in
Illinois among professional horse racing participants. Knowing more
about horses than I do about a lot of other things, I enjoyed attacking the
majority. Drugs were dangerous to horse racing, I wrote, but those drugs
were not the ones which allegedly might be taken by the participants, but
were those drugs administered to the thoroughbreds to keep them
competing. It seemed to me that jockeys were, without justification, left
with fewer constitutional rights than a defendant actually charged with a
crime. Later at a conference for federal judges at an Eastern university,
one of the speakers had some kind words for my dissent, but that was the
end of it. In another case, Judge Posner writing for the panel reversed the
district court which had held that the Army Corps of Engineers had
violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The Corps
because of some construction had granted a barge line a temporary
fleeting facility on the Illinois side of the Mississippi River without, in the
district court's view, adequately considering the environmental

26.
27.
28.
29.

Galina v. INS, No. 99-3836, 2000 WL656350 (7th Cir. May 22, 2000).
Id. at *2.
Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1991)(en banc).
Id. at 686.
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consequences. 0 The case had to do with only a small bit of the river
shoreline in the southwestern Illinois countryside, but it is part of a
unique and beautiful scenic area along the Great River Road. The trial
judge knew that area well, and so do I, but I'm not sure Judge Posner did,
nor would many of my other colleagues. They are after all mostly city
folk. Again, I enthusiastically dissented, and along with more substantive
arguments not set out here, had some words about the Corps of
Engineers:
To the Corps a thing of real beauty and professional enjoyment
will be the new lock when it is completed, not the bluffs and
river. That can be excused since the Corps, after all, is made up
of professional and talented engineers, not artists, nature lovers,
catfish fishermen, bikers, hikers, symphony directors, picnickers,
joggers, local residents, students, or tourists driving peacefully
along the Great River Road.3'
My sometimes professional disagreements with Judge Posner or any of
my other colleagues, do not cause any estrangement, but only seem to
increase our collegiability and mutual respect. Long after that case was
over, however, I did enjoy hearing the rumor that the Corps of Engineers,
even after achieving that favorable decision, had decided to go ahead and
do a full environmental impact study before proceeding further. If they
did, then I thank them for joining my dissent, even belatedly.
As you might imagine Judge Posner's work has been widely reviewed
in the press.32 An interesting interview dated September 26, 1999 was
with Linda Greenhouse who reports on the Supreme Court for The New
York Times." Her piece was entitled In His Opinion, and is about Judge
Posner's recent book, An Affair of State, analyzing President Clinton's
problems. She quotes from the book to illustrate that even the Chief
Justice who presided in the Senate over the impeachment procedure did
not escape some Posner comment. She mentions that the addition by the
Chief Justice of gold academic stripes to his black robe was described by
Judge Posner as "ridiculous" and "bizarre. 3 4 Personally, I do not object
to academic stripes. Because I can't sing a note, if I could just add an
academic stripe or two to my robe, I would no longer look like a member

30. River Rd. Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army, 764
F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1985).
31. Id. at 455.
32. See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, Is the Supreme Court Ready for this Kind of
Free-MarketJustice?, WASH. POST, September 30, 1984, at D1.
33. Linda Greenhouse, In His Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1999, at 14.
34. Id.
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of some church choir. Even if I don't always fully agree with what Judge
Posner writes, he is always good reading.
In a quiet place like this court you can see that occasionally we do have
a little fun. Our judges have and need a healthy sense of humor. We take
our work very seriously, but hopefully not ourselves. We at least
endeavor to follow the parting advice of Justice John Paul Stevens, whose
seat I now occupy on our court. He cautioned that when we must
disagree to "disagree agreeably," but our sometimes expressions of strong
contrary views are not intended to be disagreeable, just forceful. One of
my couple-of-years-ago law clerks, when his year's term was coming to an
end and I was away working on another circuit, undertook to do a video
about me as a spoof. He interviewed some of my colleagues on camera. I
knew they were great judges, but surprisingly they also showed up to be
great actors. My clerk made an appointment to interview by then Chief
Judge Posner, but my clerk got off to a bad start with him right away.
With his video camera rolling, my clerk opened the interview with, "Judge
Posner," but that was as far as he got. Apparently anticipating the use of
that recently out-of-date title, Judge Posner quickly stopped my clerk
after his two initial words. Then he reached under his chair to bring forth
and don a Native American headdress with the admonition that he was,
"Chief Judge Posner."
Although it is not very common for courts of appeal to think up and
recommend to Congress what the Congress ought to do, for instance,
adopt some new procedure, that happened in a case written by Judge
Posner.35 The opinion suggested that Congress consider the establishment
of a small claims procedure to review fee waiver denials by a government
agency under the Freedom of Information Act. 36 The fee at issue in the
case was under $40.00, but the case had occupied the time of three of our
appellate judges and countless others. There is no reason, separation of
powers or otherwise, for a court which sees firsthand a wasteful
government situation not to recommend a possible solution to Congress.
Congress can ignore the suggestion anyway.
So to close my personal observations I gladly confess my early
erroneous misgivings about Judge Posner. He did not need all the trial
experience I thought he would. I want to make clear that I came quickly
to greatly appreciate and value not only Judge Posner and his judicial
contributions, but also the contributions of the other distinguished
professors who followed Judge Posner to our court. In addition to Judge

35. Savage v. CIA, 826 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1987).

36. Id. at 563.
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Easterbrook, whom I've already mentioned, there is Judge Diane P.
Wood with high-level Department of Justice experience and a University
of Chicago professorship. Judge Kenneth Ripple, a professor from the
University of Notre Dame also joined us. He had served as a Special
Assistant to Chief Justice Burger so he had a view from the top. My four
professor colleagues have brought a new perspective and scholarly depth
to our judicial efforts. Our professor judges joining with those of us who
had trial experience both in front of the bench and on it, have helped give
our court a rich and balanced blend of scholarship and experience which
has raised our court to new heights.
When he was speaking to the delegates at the Constitutional
Convention in 1787, Ben Franklin said, "For having lived long, I have
experienced many instances of being obliged by better information or
fuller consideration to change opinions even on important subjects, which
I once thought right, but find to be otherwise." Judge Posner is a truly
remarkable man, judge and friend. We have been most fortunate to have
had him as a colleague as well as to have had our other professors. I'm
now sorry that my original welcome to Judge Posner was not more
cordial. It should have been. I still reserve the right, however, if the
occasion arises, to disagree even with such a brilliant and valued
colleague, particularly if he tries to get around me with some P x HP > (1P) x Hd solution.

